The literature dealing with the international dimensions of authoritarianism suggests that regional hegemons may exploit linkage and leverage to counter democracy and diffuse authoritarian ideas and practices. However, there is a need for more research on whether authoritarian diffusion is actually happening, including the circumstances under which linkage and leverage are translated (or not) into policy convergence. This article addresses these shortcomings by examining the high-value case of Armenia -a country with growing levels of dependence on Russia following its rejection of the EU's Association Agreement in 2013 and accession to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. Drawing on a combination of original elite and expert interviews this article argues that although there is evidence of Russian authoritarian diffusion, there is limited evidence of policy convergence. Instead, material incentives and concerns over legitimacy continue to privilege democratic norms and make the costs of Russian-style restrictive legislation prohibitive for incumbents.
Introduction
The last decade has seen increasing scholarly focus on the international dimensions of authoritarianism and the way negative external actors or 'black nights' exploit asymmetric relations, including linkage and leverage to counter democracy and diffuse authoritarian ideas and practices. In particular, Russia has been named as one of the key suspects, possessing both the means and the motives to influence regional political systems, either bilaterally or through authoritarian multi-lateral organisations (Ambrosio 2008; Bader, Grävingholt and Kästner 2010; Jackson 2010; Koesel and Bunce 2013; Tansey 2016; Von Soest 2015) . With the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis and hard competition between Russia and the West, and with an emerging global trend of declining political rights and civil liberties, the international dimensions of authoritarianism looks set to remain a salient research topic.
i However, the current research agenda is not without its limitations. The almost exclusive focus on the structural aspects of authoritarian influence has resulted in the under-elaboration of important agency considerations -a point noted by a growing number of scholars (Jackson 2010; Koesel and Bunce 2013, 753; Tansey 2016; Tolstrup 2013 ). In particular, there is a need for more research on whether authoritarian diffusion is actually happening (Ambrosio 7 based on a 'rational security logic', with Armenian President, Serzh Sargsyan, indicating that membership of Russian-led security structures made it unfeasible to opt-out of the associated economic space (RFE/RL 2016), paving the way for Armenia's eventual membership of the Eurasian Economic Union in January 2015.
The motives behind Russia's support for autocracy
In terms of the motives behind the support and promotion of autocracy, it is the regional level that currently provides the strongest rationale and the best understanding of Russia's goals.
Existing studies suggest that democratic change in any given region increases the pressure on authoritarian regimes for similar change (Pevehouse 2002) . As a country's regime tends to resemble that of their neighbours (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Von Soest 2015, 631) , Russia is seen to have a vested interest in preventing the further spread of democratising influences in order to shield its own domestic politics (Tansey 2016, 2) .
There is also an acknowledgment that Russia's economic and security interests provide an additional rationale for promoting and supporting autocracy in the region (Yakouchyk 2016, 200) . The diffusion of democratic ideas and practices increases the prospects of regime change in Russia's partner states which, in turn, increases the prospect of new leaders revising existing economic and security arrangements with Moscow. Russian autocracy promotion may help stabilise pro-Moscow regimes (e.g. through direct or indirect financial support), but as discussed in the next section, targeted information campaigns may also work on a societal-level by framing democracy as a threat to political stability and 'traditional values' in target countries, undermining public support for closer alignment with the West (e.g. the signing EU Association Agreements) and for leaving Russia's sphere of influence.
Overall, there is a clear rationale behind Russia's efforts to counter democracy in post-Soviet space. As Ambrosio aptly summarises; authoritarian regimes are not static targets for democratic diffusion, but employ active strategies, both to preserve their own political systems and to 'reinforce like-minded countries' and undermine politically dissimilar ones (Ambrosio 2008 (Ambrosio , 1325 . Moreover, there are strong indications that Russia is indeed promoting the diffusion of aspects of its own political system in neighbouring states.
In 2005, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Patrushev, stated that Russia was interested in unifying NGO legislation in CIS countries to prevent the spread of 'colour revolution' (Jackson 2010, 105) . The colour revolution phenomenon that swept incumbents from power in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan saw a prominent role for NGOs in mobilising protestors (Ambrosio 2007, 238; Finkel and Brudny 2012) , leading the Russian authorities to amend their own legislation in 2006. Aside from regulating funding for NGOs, these amendments signalled the start of an 'import substitution' strategy, in which foreignfunded NGOs would be gradually replaced by more compliant organisations financed directly by the Russian state (Henderson 2010, 255) . In 2012, following widespread protests at electoral fraud, the Russian authorities introduced a controversial 'foreign agent' law, creating a special category of NGOs in receipt of foreign financial support and engaged in 'political activity'.
In what was seen as an ominous development for Armenian civil society, the Russian ambassador, Ivan Volynkin, gave an interview in May 2014 in which he identified Westernfunded NGOs as a threat to bilateral relations, calling for them to be 'neutralised' through information campaigns and other methods (Volynkin 2014 formed an extra layer of state control over civil society (Roberts 2015, 151) . In 2012, in yet another ominous development, the Armenian Public Council produced a concept paper which included a number of controversial suggestions for regulating NGO financing (Borshchevskaya 2013) raising the prospect that the government favoured a Russian-style 'foreign agent' law.
Evidence of authoritarian diffusion
In order to facilitate analysis, this section is divided into two parts. The first part presents a 
The general situation in Armenia
In line with the framework presented in the previous section, it is possible to outline three areas where authoritarian promotion and diffusion are evident. The first relates to the deteriorating human rights situation in the country, with an indirect link to Russia. The second relates to the promotion of ideas (NGOs as a 'fifth column') through Russianlanguage media, undermining the reputation of pro-democracy organisations. 1998 -2008 ) and Serzh Sargsyan (2008 were both born in Nagorno-Karabakh and together head the informal 'Karabakh clan'. The two-week hostage crisis also saw sizeable anti-government protests. In the period 17-30
July, approximately 700 civilians were detained without grounds and around 100 people hospitalized (Ioannisyan 2016) Club -a Russian-language virtual platform for disseminating analytical articles critical of 13 Western democracy (Nikoghosyan 2016 The Armenian PPC appears to be a case of authoritarian diffusion, appearing almost identical Russian-Armenian businessman, Ara Abrahamyan (Novikova 2017, 11-12) . Abrahamyan is also the president of the Union of Armenians in Russia, which is the major organisation representing the Armenian diaspora and which openly supports Eurasian economic integration and closer ties with Russia.
Policy convergence and authoritarian diffusion
In terms of policy convergence and in particular the diffusion of legislation, there is some evidence of Russian influence, although this is mostly limited to blocking proposed laws. For Likewise, the new electoral code adopted in May 2016 was considered controversial among segments of the public and contained a number of restrictions on election observers, but was signed-off by all the political parties represented in the Armenian parliament, again receiving a positive conclusion by the Venice Commission. Electoral reform has been noted as one of several authoritarian strategies designed to weaken opposition and to bolster incumbents (Finkel and Brudny 2012, 17 ) and a key area that Russia has targeted to shore up preferred regimes in other countries (Tolstrup 2015b; Bader 2015 Bader , 1353 Bader , 1366 .
Explaining the pattern of Russian authoritarian diffusion in Armenia
The aim of this article is to assess if authoritarian diffusion is happening, but also the circumstances under which linkage and leverage are translated (or not) into policy convergence. These aims relate to the growing acknowledgement that agency considerations are under-elaborated in current research on the international dimensions of authoritarian rule (Jackson 2010; Koesel and Bunce 2013, 753; Tansey 2016; Tolstrup 2013) . As Tolstrup notes; the focus on structure, such as geographical proximity, interdependence and power asymmetries often renders frameworks unable to explain anomalies or cases that do not seem to fit the pattern (Tolstrup 2013, 717 ).
Armenia, it seems, is one such anomaly. As argued, there is evidence that authoritarian ideas and practices aimed at restricting political and civil rights, including undermining prodemocracy NGOs and mobilising opponents of gay rights and non-traditional gender relations have been promoted and diffused from Russia to Armenia. However, there remains limited evidence of policy convergence in key areas, such as NGO and electoral legislationdespite Russia's undoubted 'means and motives' to diffuse its own restrictive legislation.
How can we explain why linkage and leverage did not translate into policy convergence?
The adoption of authoritarian ideas and practices
In order to explain the pattern of Russian authoritarian diffusion in Armenia it is necessary to consider the role of 'adopters' alongside that of the 'promoters' of ideas and practices. This includes acknowledging the role of 'gatekeeper elites' (Tolstrup 2013) , who in the case of Armenia are pulled between competing external actors, including Russia, the EU and the US.
The choice here is to utilise the extant literature dealing with norm adoption. As detailed below, the competing 'logic of consequences' and 'logic of appropriateness' provide a clear framework for exploring domestic and international diffusion pressures and the way they influence policy and policy makers. But more importantly, and in view of Armenia's exposure to democratic diffusion, this framework is able to explore one obvious explanation for the pattern of authoritarian diffusion evident -the counter-balancing role of democratic norms.
A norm is understood as an inter-subjective or shared understanding of standards of behaviour, as either good or bad (Klotz 1999, 14) . The process by which norms emerge in national settings is typically theorised in either rationalist or interpretivist terms or through the competing logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness, although differences between these two logics are open to debate (Barkin 2010; March and Olsen 1989, 162) .
The logic of appropriateness is also understood as a process of socialization when an agent switches from following the logic of consequences or 'conscious instrumental calculation' to conscious role playing (Checkel 2007, 6) . In other words, norms become internalised by actors, exerting either bottom-up influence through societal mobilisation and pressure on elites or top-down influence, as elite decision-makers gradually internalise inter-subjective understandings (Checkel 2001, 57) .
As an explanation for the limited policy convergence with Russia, appropriateness or democratic socialisation, does have some 'logic'. Armenia has enjoyed a relatively longstanding relationship with Western actors, notably the EU and US, meaning the elite and public have experienced sustained exposure to democratising influences and democratic norms. As mentioned, the EU and Armenia signed a Partnership and Cooperation agreement in 1999 and an Action Plan in 2006. By the mid-2000s, it was noted by some experts that in certain areas Armenia had achieved more success in implementing its Action Plan than both Georgia and Azerbaijan (Minasian 2005, 27) , making it a reform leader in the South Caucasus.
However, the overall effectiveness of Western democracy promotion in Armenia has been questioned, with no shortage of criticism surrounding the vagueness of EU programmes and EU inconsistency (Smith 2005, 764-5) . In addition, the absence of any realistic prospect of EU membership for Eastern European Neighbourhood Policy countries is seen as a serious hindrance to democracy promotion efforts (Chryssogelos 2017, 260 Rather, it is the logic of consequences that offers the best explanation for the pattern of authoritarian diffusion seen in Armenia since 2013. Norm adoption, as viewed from the logic of consequences is driven by actor preferences and expectations and a general attempt to make outcomes meet subjective desires (March and Olsen 1989, 160) . In fact, much of the new legislation adopted by Armenia, in particular the new electoral code, was conditioned on EU aid, giving power-holders a clear incentive to work closely with the EU and associated bodies to pass acceptable legislation. Although Russia possesses both the resources and agencies capable of lobbying the country's wider interests (Lough et al. 2014, in the case of Armenia, there is a perceived lack of commitment: 'Russia is trying to build influence. In 2013, Parent's Committees were simultaneously established in Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Armenia …but they don't have money to support campaigns directly'.
(Interview, David Armeniyan, 2016).
However, material incentives do not fully account for the pattern of authoritarian diffusion seen in Armenia. While they offer a potential explanation for the absence of Russian-style restrictive NGO and electoral legislation, they do not explain the failure of the Armenian authorities to adopt other laws conditioned by EU funding. For example, the aforementioned legislation on domestic violence was not only supported by the EU, but an 11 million euro aid package was contingent on its adoption (Abrahamyan2017). Although the authorities have vowed to organise public discussions, the withdrawal of this law in 2017 seems to indicate successful Russian diffusion.
The role of legitimacy
The logic of consequences is not confined to material utility or to the role of external sanctions and incentives. Elites may adopt norms in the absence of external pressure because they perceive an instrumental benefit in doing so, and this benefit may include increasing their own legitimacy -even if actors do not view the norms as legitimate (Wendt 1999, 271 ).
As such, concerns over legitimacy, in particular at the elite level, form part of the logic of consequences and have been used to explain the adoption and rejection of international norms in other contexts (Acharya 2004, 248; Katsumata 2011; Klotz 1999, 27) . As argued in this article, in addition to material incentives, legitimacy is a key contextual variable that explains the policy choices of the Armenian ruling elite.
According to Freedom House, Armenia's democracy rating has been remarkable consistent in the period 2008-2017, but this belies persistent corruption problems and an oligarchic clan system that has gradually consolidated its hold over the political system, leading some to classify Armenia as a 'semi-autocratic' regime (Chryssogelos 2017, 269) . vi Importantly, the legitimacy of the ruling group has weakened considerably following the 2008 presidential election, when power was passed within the 'Karabakh clan', from Robert Kochyran to Serzh Sargsyan.
The 2008 presidential election was considered fraudulent by supporters of second placed candidate, Levon Ter-Petrosyan -Armenia's first president -and mass protests followed. On There is no trust in the government and there is no trust in the opposition either', meaning that political dissatisfaction is more likely to get channelled through 'extraordinary means', as seen in the civil unrest surrounding the events in July 2016 (Interview, Mark Grigoryan, 2016 ).
As such, and with single digit approval for domestic politics, the search for legitimacy in a semi-authoritarian regime, like Armenia's, has influenced attitudes toward the NGO sector.
The role of NGOs in Armenian society and the political system is complex and at times contradictory. Estimations of the Armenian NGO sector are not always positive (Loda 2016; Paturyan and Gevorgyan 2014) and opinion polls show consistently low trust ratings for NGOs (22 per cent in 2015), but still higher than political parties and parliament (9 per cent and 11 per cent in 2015 respectively, Caucasusbarometer 2015). In particular, NGOs often have a negative stereotype as 'grant eaters' -organisations that take money but which have little positive impact on the lives of ordinary people.
However, there is also a suggestion that the NGO sector is becoming more important due to the nuances of the political system, and that NGOs offer better platforms for talented young people to affect political life -more so than political parties, in particular opposition parties.
Although NGOs by definition do not possess political power, they do retain influence and enjoy other advantages, 'NGOs are influential because they are financed by the West and have hardly any pressure on them; a person is much freer than in a political party ' (Interview Daniel Ionesyan, 2016) .
There is also a suggestion that the government uses NGOs to boost the legitimacy of key policy in the eyes of domestic and international audiences. A positive assessment from civil society on important legislation, for example, is more likely to enhance popular estimations of the political system but also secure continued funding from Western donors, 'They can go to the EU and say 'look, civil society is ok with this, so give us the money'. They can't go to fake NGOs, they have to go to real NGOs' (Interview, David Armeniyan, 2016) . This use of NGOs if often in tandem with compliant 'opposition parties' which act as intermediaries with civil society to confer legitimacy on political processes within the country. This process was seen clearly in the drafting of the new electoral code, in which NGOs played an unusually prominent role. The draft legislation was drawn up in the socalled 4+4+4 format -four members of the ruling party, four representatives from the opposition, and four from civil society. Aside from approximately 16 million euros of funding depending on the adoption of an approved electoral code, 'part of the idea of the 4+4+4 format was to boost public trust' (Interview, Naira Zohrabyan, 2016).
In fact, there is some evidence that the authorities were keen to increase the public standing of NGOs with the new legislation that came into effect in 2017. For example, the new regulations subjecting NGOs in receipt of state funding to an external audit are less a restriction and more a measure to fight corruption and claims that fake NGOs are syphoning off state money. In 2013, it was reported that a number of NGOs had received over 1 million USD in government grants, 2011-2012, but were non-existent, with links to untraceable individuals or individuals closely connected to the ruling group (Martirosian 2013) . In a similar way, Armenia's aforementioned Public Council, created in 2008, was less a means of increasing control over civil society and more a way for the ruling group to repair damaged state-society relations and to establish greater dialogue with the NGO sector following the 2008 election 'legitimacy crisis' (Borshchevskaya 2013) .
The search for legitimacy also offers an explanation for the effectiveness of some of the ideas and practices emanating from Russia. As seen in the previous section, there is evidence that Russia has at least promoted certain restrictions on civil and political rights with a particular focus on gay rights and non-traditional gender relations, in part to create a 'civilizational gulf' between the EU and new and prospective member states. In the case of Armenia, this has been greatly facilitated by Russian language media but also a receptive public audience. 
Conclusions
This article contributes to existing literature on the international dimensions of authoritarianism by addressing the 'agency deficit' and by considering evidence of authoritarian diffusion but also the circumstances under which linkage and leverage are translated (or not) into policy convergence. In the case of Armenia, 2013 Armenia, -2017 , there is evidence of authoritarian diffusion, but limited evidence of policy convergence in key areas, such as NGO and electoral legislation -despite the opportunity of major amendments. Based on the previous discussion, there are three concluding observations to make regarding policy, the mechanisms behind authoritarian diffusion and future research avenues respectively. First, and in terms of policy suggestions, there is a clear relationship between authoritarian diffusion and democratic diffusion. As argued in this article, material incentives and concerns over legitimacy continue to privilege democratic norms and to make the costs of Russianstyle restrictive legislation prohibitive for incumbents. The implication is that, despite the limited embeddedness of democratic norms in much of the post-Soviet space, including Armenia, democracy promotion is effective in countering authoritarian diffusion, meaning continued Western support for democracy is essential for halting the regional and global 23 trend of declining political rights and civil liberties. Although Russia is not regarded as a 'credible source of policy templates for modernisation' in many countries, including Armenia (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015, 502) , this may change in the future, meaning that Russianinspired authoritarian diffusion should not be underestimated.
Second, and in terms of mechanisms, diffusion is not the only explanation for the persistence of authoritarianism in the post-Soviet space nor the only way Russia contributes to negative democratic trends in the region. Russian influence seems to create a 'zone of permissiveness' where states are able to ignore their democratic commitments, with the support of Moscow, even if no diffusion is evident. In this sense, part of Russia's attractiveness in the region is premised on what Wilson and Popescu identify as a durable trend in the East -the desire of smaller states to retain as much sovereignty as possible and to play off the EU and Russia against each other (Wilson and Popescu 2009, 318) . In the case of Armenia, Russia is permissive of both the Sargsyan regime and its desire to retain close links with the EU and US, in return for loyalty and a continuing Russian presence in the South Caucasus.
The final observation relates to avenues for future research. In line with the agency deficit already mentioned, more attention should be devoted to the subject of 'localisation' and the way seemingly powerless actors have room to adopt, reject and adapt ideas and practices.
While there is a general acknowledgment that small states are subject to profound systemic foreign policy constraints due to their weakness in the international system (Hey 2003, 193) , small or weak states often have surprising agency to achieve their goals (Kassab 2015) .
Future diffusion from external actors in Armenia, but also the wider region, will likely result in 'a dynamic process of matchmaking' (Acharya 2004, 243) , with the ruling elites mixing democratic and authoritarian ideas and practices in a way that fits context-specific international and domestic constraints.
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Notes
i A total of 67 countries suffered net declines in political rights and civil liberties in 2016, compared with 36 registering gains. ii A sample of experts, party politicians and NGOs was created prior to the two field trips in 2014 and 2016, although referential sampling proved effective. Overall, the respondents' impressions and views of the political situation in Armenia, and Russia's influence were essential in researching this difficult topic. All interviews were conducted in Yerevan, unless stated otherwise. iii These are estimates. For more detail on the extent of casualties on both sides see Sanamyan (2016) . iv Daredevils of Sassoun is the tile of an Armenian poem dating back to the eighth century and documenting the struggle to drive Arab invaders from Armenia. v For an example of homophobic, anti-Western, Russian-language propaganda see Areshev (2013) .
